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Abstract. We propose the use of the angel-daemon framework to assess the
Coleman’s power of a collectivity to act under uncertainty in weighted voting
games. First, we introduce a perturbation strength model describing the potential
changes in the weights of a weighted game. Based on S, an uncertainty profile U ,
fixes the spread of the weights’ change. In the angel-daemon framework uncer-
tainty profiles describe the potential changes in the weights of a weighted game
and fixes the spread of the weights’ change. For each uncertainty profile a strate-
gic a/d game can be considered. The game has two selfish players, the angel a
and the daemon d, a selects their action as to minimize the effect on the mea-
sure under consideration while d acts oppositely. Players a and d give a balance
between the best and the the best and the worst. The a/d games associated to
the Coleman’s power are constant sum games and therefore the expected utilities
of all the Nash equilibria in the a/d associated to an uncertainty profile are the
same. In this way we can asses the Coleman’s power under uncertainty. Besides
introducing the framework for this particular setting and analyzing some com-
putational complexity considerations we provide several examples based in the
evolution of the voting rules of the EU Council of Ministers.
Keywords. Weighted voting games, Coleman’s Power of a Collectivity to act,
Uncertainty profiles, Strategic games, EU Council of Ministers.
1 Introduction
The distinction between risk and uncertainty has become increasingly important since
[?] discussed it as we have imperfect knowledge of future events in our ever-changing
world. Informally, risk can be measured by probabilities. In contrast, uncertainty refers
to something where we cannot even gather the information required to figure out prob-
abilities. However, in practice both are measured by historical standard deviation of
the variable of interest [?,?]. This paper proposes an alternative to disentangle these
seemingly indistinguishable concepts applying ideas from game theory and computer
science.
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The study of web applications is a field where uncertainty becomes unavoidable.
The angel-daemon framework [?] provides a way to obtain numerical estimates of un-
certainty in the execution of a Web service. In such a setting, the uncertainty is captured
by an uncertainty profile describing a stressed environment for the execution of the
Web application. Uncertainty profiles provide a description of the perceived uncertain
behaviour with respect to possible failing services or execution delays. That is, some
sites can potentially misbehave but we are uncertain about the specific sites that will do
so. The model attempts to balance positive and negative aspects. Considering only pos-
itive aspects (minimizing damage) is usually too optimistic. In the opposite side, being
pessimistic (maximizing damage) is also not realistic. Reality often evolves in between
optimism and pessimism. To model this situation, the framework considers two agents
: the angel (a), dealing with the optimistic side; and the daemon (d), dealing with the
pessimistic side. These agents act strategically in an associated angel-daemon zero-sum
game. In this context, uncertain situations are identified with the Nash equilibria of the
angel-daemon game and they are assessed by the value of the game. It is important
to emphasize that the results in [?] are useful to analyse uncertain stable (or timeless)
environments. Thus, the framework analyses uncertainty in the short-term and it is not
useful for a long-term analysis.
In this paper, we extend the aangel-daemon (a/d) framework to asses uncertainty in
a collective measure of power the Coleman’s power index [2]. The study of the power
of the players inside a weighted voting games [8] is a well developed topic started
by Lloyd Shapley in 1953 [7]. Also, the study of the uncertainty in such a weighted
voting systems has been considered under a theoretical [3] or practical [6] aspects. Less
studied is the study of the power of game as a whole without emphasizing the role of
the different players but taking the collectivity as a whole. In 1971 James Coleman
[2] introduced the formal definition of the power of a collectivity to act denoted as
Act. Practical applications appears in [2]. More recently, in [1] (Table 4), the power if
the EU Council of Ministers from 1958 to 2007 is analyzed. We do that in two steps.
First, uncertainty profiles [5] bounds in a macroscopic way the spread of the global
uncertainty. Second, the associated a/d-games provides a balance of the uncertainty
in between the best and the worst scenarios. Given an uncertainty profile U shaped to
deal with Act, the a/d game associated verifies the following: all the Nash equilibria
have the same a utility. Therefore we propose to take this utility as an assessment of the
Coleman’s power to act under uncertainty Act(U).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the preliminaries in
weighted voting games and Coleman’s power to act. In Section ?? we develop a pertur-
bation strength model for weighted voting games. In particular the basic properties of
the small perturbations case, P lusMinus , are developed. Section 3 devoted to uncer-
tainty profiles and a/d games in general. In Section ?? we develop the uncertainty in for
majority voting games. Finally Section 7 is devoted to conclusions and open problems.
2 Preliminaries
A simple game Γ is given by a tuple (N,W) where N is a set of n players andW is a
monotonic family of subsets of N [?]. In the context of simple games, the subsets of N
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are called coalitions, N is the grand coalition and S ∈ W is a winning coalition. Any
subset ofN which is not a winning coalition is called a losing coalition. The Coleman’s
power of the collectivity to act [2], is defined as Act(Γ ) = #W/2n. This measure of
collective power Act(Γ ) can be seen as the probability of the yes outcome assuming
that all coalitions are equally like.
A weighted voting game [8] is a simple game defined by a tuple Γ = 〈q;w1, . . . wn〉,
where q is the quota and wi ∈ N+ is the weight of player i, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The
set of players is N = [n] = {1, . . . , n}. Let w(S) = ∑i∈S wi denote the weight of
coalition S. The set of winning coalitions isW(Γ ) = {S | w(S) ≥ q}. Therefore, the
set of losing coalitions is L(Γ ) = {S | w(S) < q}. Let us consider the case where
the weights of all the players are equal, Γ = 〈q;w, . . . , w〉 with n > 1. We denote
such a game as Γn(q;w). Observe that, for S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} it holds w(S) = w ×#S
and W(Γ ) = {S | w × #S ≥ q}. In the case of equal weights, to catch the straight
majority of of the total weight it is needed to capture a weight strictly greater than
nw
2 . In such a case we cannot distinguish between the requirement of having the ma-
jority of the players from having the majority of the players. In fact any quota be-
tween bnw2 c + 1 and wbn2 c + 1). We will consider two basic families of weighted
voting games. The equal weight majority on n players in which all the players have
the same weight w, denote as Γ (n, q, w) and the equal weight majority on n players
game as Γ (n,w) = Γ (n,wbn/2⌋ + 1, w). Observe thatW(Γ (n,w)) = W(Γ (n, 1))
Act(Γ (n,w)) = Act(Γ (n, 1)).
In order to develop some examples, we consider the weights of the different states
at the Council of Ministers of the EU (now the Council of the EU) along the time
[1]. In 1958 the founding members were Germany (DE), France (FR), Italy (IT), The
Netherlands (NL), Belgium (BE), and Luxembourg (LU) listed in non-decreasing order
of assigned weights. The Council of Ministers at 1958 is summarized as ΓTheSix =
〈12; 4, 4, 4, 2, 2, 1, 〉. The quota was defined by a qualified majority rule, QMR, of the
70.6%4 that is q = 12 ≈ 17 ∗ (70.6/100) = 12.002. Along the period 1958 to 2014
the number of states increases from the initial 6 to 9, 10, 12, 15, 25 and 27. The voting
system changed to cover the new arrivals. This leas to 25 different voting systems were
used described by the following weighted voting games taken from [1].
ΓEC6 = 〈12; 4, 4, 4, 2, 2, 1〉, ΓEC9 = 〈41; 10, 10, 10, 10, 5, 5, 3, 3, 2〉
ΓEC10 = 〈45; 10, 10, 10, 10, 5, 5, 5, 3, 3, 2〉, ΓEC12 = 〈54; 10, 10, 10, 5, 5, 2, 10, 8, 5, 5, 3, 3〉
ΓEC15 = 〈62; 10, 10, 10, 10, 8, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 2〉,
ΓEC251 = 〈88; 10, 10, 10, 10, 8, 8, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2〉,
ΓEC252 = 〈232; 29, 29, 29, 13, 12, 4, 29, 27, 27, 12, 12, 12, 12, 10, 10, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3〉
ΓEC27 = 〈255; 29, 29, 29, 29, 27, 27, 14, 13, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 10, 10, 10,
7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3〉
In all those games players 1 to 6 correspond to the six founding members in the same
order as in the 1958 description. The parameters of those games and the Coleman’s
Power are:
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ΓEC6 ΓEC9 ΓEC10 ΓEC12 ΓEC15 ΓEC251 ΓEU252 ΓEC27
Total = w(N) 17 58 63 76 87 124 321 345
% 70.6 70.7 71.4 71.1 71.3 71 72.3 73.9
#W 14 75 140 402 2549 1170000 1204448 2718774
Power to Act 0.2187 0.1464 0.1455 0.0981 0.0777 0.0348 0.0358 0.0202
Note that the power to act is quite small and roughly decreases along the time.
3 Uncertainty profiles and a/d games
Let us move on to adapt the definition of uncertainty profiles [5], [4]. They are useful
to describe situations in which we have an approximate idea of the extension of the
perturbation but we are uncertain over the specific location where it will impact the
system. They are essentially based on three components: the set of weights that may
be perturbed; the extent to which the perturbation can be applied; and the number of
the components that can suffer perturbations. In an angel daemon framework we have
two types of perturbations that will be exerted by a towards increasing Act and by d to
decrease it.
In an a/d framework two agents are considered: the angel (a), dealing with the
optimistic side; and the daemon (d), dealing with the pessimistic side of a perturbation.
In our game, these agents act over the model by applying perturbations on the players’
weights: the angels act in such a way to maximize the power to act and the daemon acts
in order to minimize it. The perturbation values are real numbers, so they can be either
positive or negative and we assume that both the angel and the daemon have limits in
the influence they can exert.
Definition 1. A uncertain profile is a tuple U = 〈Γ,A,D, δa, δd, ba, bd, 〉 where Γ =
〈q;w1, . . . , wn〉 is a weighted voting game; A,D ⊆ [n]; δa : A → Z and δd : D → Z
represent the strength of the perturbation; ba, bd ∈ N are such that ba ≤ #A and
bd ≤ #D and they represent the spread of the perturbation.
The exerted perturbation follows from joint actions (a, d), verifying a ⊆ A, d ⊆ D
with #a = ba and #d = bd. The effects of a joint action is a perturbed game Γ [a, d] =
〈q;w′1, . . . , w′n〉 where
w′i = wi +

0 if i /∈ a ∪ d,
δa(i) if i ∈ a \ d,
δd(i) if i ∈ d \ a,
δa(i) + δd(i) if i ∈ a ∩ d.
To ensure w′i ∈ N+ we require that |δa(i)|, |δd(i)| < wi.
We are interested to know how a and d joint actions affect the number of winning
coalitions through the perturbed game.
Example 1. Take U = 〈〈30; 10, 10, 10, 5, 5, 2〉, {1, 5}, {1, 5}, (19, 7), (−6,−3), 1, 1〉.
Each joint action defines a perturbed game: Γ [{1}, {1}] = 〈30; 23, 10, 10, 5, 5, 2〉 and
Γ [{5}, {5}] = 〈30; 10, 10, 10, 5, 9, 2〉 as an example. Observe that#W(Γ [{1}, {1}]) =
and #W(Γ [{5}, {5}]) = 17. uunionsq
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To asses the uncertainty of the power to act in an uncertainty profile we introduce
an strategic zero-sum a/d game and use the value of this associated game.
Definition 2. Given U = 〈Γ,A,D, δa, δd, ba, bd, 〉 , the associated angel/daemon (or
a/d) game is Γ (U) = 〈{a, d}, Aa, Ad, ua, ud〉. Game Γ (U) has two players: the angel
a and the daemon d. The player’s actions are Aa = {a ⊆ A | #a = ba} and Ad =
{d ⊆ D | #d = bd}. For (a, d) ∈ Aa × Ad utilities are ua(a, d) = #W(Γ [a, d]) and
ud(a, d) = −ua(a, d).
Notice that, in an a/d game the set of strategy profiles is Aa×Ad. A player’s choice
of actions can be done probabilistically. Mixed strategies for a and d are probability
distributions α : Aa → [0, 1] and β : Ad → [0, 1] respectively. A mixed strategy is
a tuple (α, β) such that up(α, β) =
∑
(a,d)∈Aa×Ad α(a)up(a, d)β(d) for p ∈ {a, d}.
Let ∆a and ∆d denote the set of mixed strategies for players a and d, respectively. A
pure strategy profile (a, d) is a special case of mixed strategy profile (α, β) in which
α(a) = 1 and β(d) = 1. A mixed strategy profile (α, β) is a Nash equilibrium if for
any α′ ∈ ∆a it holds ua(α, β) ≥ ua(α′, β) and for any β′ ∈ ∆d it holds ud(α, β) ≥
ud(α, β
′). A pure Nash equilibrium, PNE, is a Nash equilibrium (a, d) where a and d
are pure strategies.
Example 2. SHOULD BE A FOLLOW-UP OF current Ex 1 Given U in Example 4,ac-
tions are Aa = Ad = {{1}, {2}} and Γ (U) is given by the utility of the row player, a,
in the following table
{1} {2}
{1} ua = #W(〈30; 9, 10, 10, 10, 2, 5〉) = 17
ud = 2
6 − ua = 47
ua = #W(〈30; 12, 4, 10, 10, 2, 5〉) = 13
ud = 51
{2} ua = #W(〈30; 2, 29, 10, 10, 2, 5〉) = 31
ud = 33
ua = #W(〈30; 5, 23, 10, 10, 2, 5〉) = 30
ud = 34
with PNE = {({2}, {2})} uunionsq
It is well known that all Nash equilibria of zero-sum game G have the same value
ν(G) corresponding to the utility of the row player. Considering that in a/d games the
row player id a we can extend the Coleman’s power to act to an uncertainty profile U
as follows.
Definition 3. Let U = 〈Γ,A,D, δa, δd, ba, bd〉, be an uncertainty profile, the Cole-
man’s power to act of U is Act(U) = #W(U)/2n.
Observe that according to Act(U) is the Coleman’s power to act of a weighted voting
game when G(U) has a PNE or an average of the Coleman’s power to act of several
games, under a NE distribution. When (α, β) is a Nash equilibrium of G(U) the a
utility is
∑
(a,d)∈Aa×Ad α(a)
(
#W(ΓS [a, d])
)
β(d) and therefore we get the expression
Act(U) =∑(a,d)∈Aa×Ad α(a)(Act(ΓS [a, d]))β(d).
Example 3. SHOULD BE A FOLLOW-UP OF previous or some with a non pure NE
Example 4. MAKES ANY SENSE NOW? Take U = 〈〈30; 5, 10, 10, 10, 2, 5〉,SSix,A,D, 1, 1, ua, ud〉
based on Example 8. where A = D = {1, 2} and ua(a, d) = #W(ΓSSix [a, d]),
ud(a, d) = #L(ΓSSix [a, d]). For instance ua({1}, {1}) = #W(〈30; 9, 10, 10, 10, 2, 5〉) =
17. uunionsq
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4 Majority games with equal weights
We consider first the simplest case of weighted games in which all the players have
equal weight, Γ (n, q, w) or Γ (n,w). Let us consider weighted voting games that can
be seen as a small perturbations of Γn(n,w). We start just perturbing the weight of the
two players with opposite strengths. By straightforward combinatorial arguments we
get:
Lemma 1. check that the statement is correct changed δ = 1 to 0 < δ < w. Let
n > 2, w > 1 and 0 < δ < w, i, j ∈ [n] so that i 6= j. Let Γ = Γ (n,w) and
U(δ; i, j) = 〈Γ, {i}, {j}, (δ), (−δ), 1, 1〉 and Γ ′ = Γ [{i}, {j}]. Then, we have
W(Γ ′) = {S | #S ≥ bn/2c+ 1} ∪ {{2} ∪ S | S ⊆ N \ {i, j},#S = bn/2c − 1}
and the number of winning coalitions is
#W(Γ ′) = #W(Γ (n,w)) +
(
n− 2
bn/2c − 1
)
.
Example 5. Take n = 3, w = 2 and δ = 1. In such a case wbn/2⌋ + 1 = 3 and
Γ(3, 2) = 〈3; 2, 2, 2〉. Under U(δ; i, j) we have Γ [{1}, {2}] = 〈3; 1, 3, 2〉. The sets of
winning coalitions areW(Γ (3, 2) = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}} and
W(Γ [{1}, {2}] =W(Γ (3, 2)) ∪ {{2}}. uunionsq
In order to provide intuition on the use of a and d we analyze now the case with
equal and opposite strengths. Let n > 2, w > 1, 0 < |δ| < w Γ , and let (A,D ⊆
[n], the minimal egalitarian uncertainty profile is defined as ME(n,w, δ;A,D) =
〈Γ (n,w),A,D, δa, δd, 1, 1〉, where δa(i) = δ, for i ∈ A, and δd(i) = −δ, for i ∈ D.
Lemma 2. Let n > 2, w > 1 and 0 < δ < w, let A,D ⊆ [n]. Let Γ = Γ (n,w)
and U = ME(n,w, δ;A,D), then we have #W(Γ [{i}, {i}]) = #W(Γ (w, n)), for
i ∈ A ∩ D and #W(Γ [{i}, {j}] = #W(Γ [{k}, {`}] ≥ #W(Γ (w, n)), for i, k ∈ A,
j.` ∈ D, i 6= j and k 6= `.
Proof. Observe that when both a and d select a common player {i} the two perturba-
tions cancel and the so obtained game id the initial one. When (a, d) = ({i}, {j}) with
i 6= j the perturbed game has one player with weight w+ δ, another with weight w− δ
and the remaining players with weight w. Thus the game is the same up to a permu-
tation of the players and in such a case the number of winning coallitions is the same.
The last inequality follows from Lemma 1. uunionsq
Theorem 1. Let n > 2 and w > 1 and 0 < δ < w, let A,D ⊆ [n]. Assume that
#A > 0, #D > 0 Let Γ = Γ (n,w) and U = ME(n,w, δ;A,D). Then, if A = D,
Γ (U) has no PNE. If A 6= D and A ⊆ D PNE(Γ (U)) = {({i}, {i}) | i ∈ A, j ∈ D}
and Act(U) = Act(Γ (n,w), otherwise PNE(Γ (U)) = {({i}, {i}) | i ∈ A \ D, j ∈ D}
and Act(U) = Act(Γ (n,w) + 12n
(
n−2
bn/2c−1
)
.
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Proof. From Def. 2, Aa × Ad = {({i}, {j}) | (i, j) ∈ A × D} as by Lemma 2 all
perturbed games are only of two types Γ [{i}, {i}] or Γ [{i}, {j}], j 6= i. If A ⊆ D,
for each action {i} of a, d best response is {i}. Otherwise, for each action {j} of d, a
best response is {i} for some i /∈ D. This provides the characterization of the PNE. The
later expression follows from Lemma 1. uunionsq
Let us conclude with an example in which the a/d game has no PNE but exactly one
NE.
Example 6. Let n > 2 andw > 1. let Γ = Γ (n,w) and U =ME(n,w, 1; {1, 2}, {1, 2}),
by Theorem 1 we know that G(U) has no PNE. As ba = bd = 1 we have Aa = Ad ={{1}, {2}} and a’s payoff matrix in the a/d game is
{1} {2}
{1} #W(Γ (n,w)) #W(Γ (n,w) + 12n
(
n−2
bn/2c−1
)
{2} #W(Γ (n,w) + 12n
(
n−2
bn/2c−1
)
#W(Γ (n,w))
It is easy to see that the unique (mixed) Nash equilibrium is (α, β) = ((1/2, 1/2), (1/2, 1/2)).
Therefore, Act(U) = Act(Γ (n,w)) + 12n−1
(
n−2
bn/2c−1
)
. uunionsq
5 Computational complexity considerations
Observe that the number of wining coalitions in a weighted voting games corresponds
to counting the number of solutions of a Knapsack problem which is known to be a #P-
complete problem []. We analyze here the extent to which such hardness result can be
extended to computing the value of the associated a/d games and related computational
problems. In particular we consider the following problems:
– EQACT: Given two weighted voting games Γ and Γ ′ on n players, is Act(Γ ) =
Act(Γ ′).
– ISBESTR Given an uncertainty profile U and a joint action (a, d) ∈ Aa×d, is d a
best response to a in G(U)?
– VALUE Given an uncertainty profile U , compute ν(G(U)).
Theorem 2. EQACT is co-NP-hard and can be solved in pseudopolynomial time. IS-
BESTR is NP-hard. try to complete this!
6 A study based on the Council of Ministers of the EC
Observe that computing the number of wining coalitions can be done in pseudopoly-
nomial time using Dynamic Programming on an array of size
∑n
i=1 wi. However even
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when the weights are polynomial in the number of players the number of strategies can
still be exponential. However, when the weights (initial and perturbed) are polynomial
in n and the spread is constant it is possible to compute a complete description of G(U)
and using a LP solver obtaining the value of the game. This has been our approach to
develop de following examples. Our objective is to analyze the assessments of different
uncertainty profiles. We also want to explore the differences in the assessment when in
the perturbed weighted voting game instead of preserving the quota we keep only its
proportionality to the total weight. For doing so we asses different uncertainty profile
for the 25 voting systems of the EC when the uncertainty fells on top of the weights of
the six founder members.
Example 7. Consider the weights of the funding states in EC6 , EC12 and EC27. We
can see the weights of EC6 and EC27 as obtained by perturbations of those of EC12. a
moves forward the weights to those in EC27 while d wishes to move them back to EC6.
Assuming the A = B = {1, . . . , 6}, we get the expressions:
DE FR IT NL LU BE
EC6 4 4 4 2 2 1
EC12 10 10 10 5 5 2
EC27 29 29 29 13 12 4
δ12−27 19 19 19 8 7 2
δ12−6 -6 -6 -6 -3 -3 -1
We assesed uncertainty profiles of the form U12(b) = 〈ΓEC12, [6], [6], δ12−27, δ12−6, b, b〉 >
our results are summarized in the following table.
TBD
uunionsq
Example 8. From previous draft Focusing on the initial six in EC12 and keeping a
% of 71.1 we get a quota of 30. The restriction of the six inside EC12 is described
by Γ = 〈30; 5, 10, 10, 10, 2, 5〉. Given SSix in Example 7 we consider some cases
of ΓSSix(a, d). To do that we need to pay attention to δSSix(i)[a, d]. For instance, take
(a, d) = ({1}, {1}) where 1 corresponds to Belgium. As i ∈ a ∩ d, according to Defi-
nition ?? we have δSSix(1)[{1}, {1}] = δa(1) + δd(1) = 7− 3 = 4 and w1[{1}, {1}] =
w1 + 4 = 9. For i ∈ {2, 6} we have i /∈ a ∪ d and therefore w′i = wi. Therefore
ΓSSix({1}, {1}) = 〈30; 9, 10, 10, 10, 2, 5〉. Consider (a, d) = ({1}, {2}) where 2 cor-
responds to France. As 1 ∈ a \ d it holds w′1 = w1 + δa(1) = 12. As 2 ∈ d \ a it
holds w′2 = w2 + δd(2) = 4. As other weights remain unchanged, ΓSSix({1}, {2}) =
〈30; 12, 4, 10, 10, 2, 5〉. uunionsq
7 Conclusions and open problems
In order to tackle with the uncertainty in Coleman’s power to act Act issued from the
imprecisions on weights in voting games we introduce uncertainty profiles and define
Act(U). We have proved the uniqueness of Act(U) and developed several properties
and examples.
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Other topics merits to be studied. in particular in [2] two other measures are also
considered for any player i of a weighted voting game Γ . The power to initiate action,
Initiatei(Γ ) = #{S ∈ L(Γ ) | S∪{i} ∈ W(Γ )}/#L(Γ ). The power of i to initiate ac-
tion give us the likelihood that i turns a loosing coalition into a winning one. The power
to prevent action, Preventi(Γ ) = #{S ∈ W(Γ ) | S \ {i} ∈ L(Γ )})/#W(Γ ). The
power of i to prevent action is the fraction of winning coalitions for which i is critical.
It remains open how to deal with with the power to initiate or the power to prevent in an
uncertain environment. This will allow us to compare with the probabilistic approach
undertaken in [1]. It will be also interested to get uncertainty profiles well adapted to
the Shapley values. This will allow us to compare with probabilistic approaches like the
one given in [3]. This will allow us to compare with much more practical approaches
like those given in [6] and [1].
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